soc.history.war.world-war-ii

Duwop wrote:

> But the point was simply that bad torpedos were going to be taken
> more seriously by the Kriegsmarine for good reason.

I had understood your point, beyond the hyperbole, but I'm still not
sure that I agree with it.

The submarine arm was prorportionally larger within the Kriegsmarine
than it was within the USN, but:

- it was very much a minority within both navies, and in neither was
it considered the main striking arm,
- the weight of the USN within the US armed services was far greater
than that of the Kriegsmarine within the Wehrmacht,
- the USN was using far more torpedos than the Kriegsmarine so the
problem was more important - in addition to submarines, destroyers
carried torpedos.

So in both cases there were good arguments for not bothering with a
pesky subordinate in charge or a relatively unimportant service.
In both cases, the technical services tried to hide the true scope of
the problem, with the first automatic response being to blame any
problem on the end users.

Where I would agree that the Germans were less likely to accept that
explanation is because of their emphasis on personnel. The skill of
the end user counted for much in German culture in general, the whole
Wehrmacht was largely based around it - this predated the Nazis - and
the NSDAP had pushed it to new heights with its cult of the super-
achieving hero figure. This means that when such a figure - like a U-
boat skipper - ranked higher in the social order than a bureaucrat. If
a German Mush Morton complained of torpedo troubles, the ordnance
bureau would be unable to simply dismiss the complaint: an
investigation would take place so for the ordnance people to win that
particular fight they would need to have a very solid case. Obviously,
not everything was helpful about that attitude: the economy was
plagued by constant demands for minor modifications from the armed
forces rather than the latter being told to use what they had and stop
messing around with the production curves built by some paper-pushing
deskbound fighter. But in the case of torpedos, it definitely helped
to generate action.

And I hadn't construed your point to be an excuse for the USN, but the
above indicates that prompter German action had to do with other
factors, as far as I can tell, than the respective weight of the
submarine arms.

> What percentage of men were
> in U-boots Vs. surface for instance? Certainly much higher than the
> USN or RN.

I don't know, but as far as I can tell the answer is "a minority"
until 1943. I'd agree to rate the submarine arm as the prime fighting
service after Barbarossa, given how little surface action there was
after that date, but not necessarily in 1939.

> > Further note that in 1942 one could make a case that the submarines
> > also were the main USN striking force...
>
> I'd like to see someone try. Outside of very localized exceptions of
> course, say the western Pacific. ;)

The USN had no real striking force in the Atlantic (didn't need one)
and submarine operations were the only kind of offensive operations
being conducted against Japan for some time, especially by late 1942
when carriers were all sunk or in repairs. By that time, I would argue
that the Silent Service was about as important to the US war effort as
the U-boats had been to Germany in 1939, and still the Kriegsmarine
took action while the USN did not. This to me indicates more than the
respective shares in personnel.


LC