soc.history.war.world-war-ii

eunometic wrote:

> The Germans dealt with their problems faster because they acknowledged
> them almost immediatly. Admiral Donitz was accepting no excuses and
> neither was Gross Admiral Raeder.

The Germans definitely dealt with their problems faster than the USN,
though Raeder did initially accept excuses.

(copy/paste of one of my posts from a different forum)

The short answer is that the Torpedo Directorate was looking at
technical paliatives (albeit minor ones) within a month of the first
incidents being reported and never blamed the end users. Within 9
months the problem was effectively solved.

To anticipate the next round of questions about my source, here's a
chronology, with page numbers from Blair's "The Hunters".

14 Sept 39 - U-29 attacks a British tanker and gets two premature
explosions (magnetic exploders used). The skipper decides this is
grave enough to break radio silence and report to Dönitz. Dönitz turns
to the Torpedo Directorate (TD) whose experts recommend tuning down
the sensitivity of the magnetic pistols and to use impact pistol for
smaller ships (p.89).

End Sept 39 - after 13 skippers reported torpedo problems that month,
Dönitz drafts a report and gets Raeder and OKM to order TD to conduct
an investigation. This outlines two flaws and recommends to alter the
cable layout in the eletric torpedoes while using the contact pistol
for the air torpedoes. Dönitz believes that the torpedoes also run too
deep, but issues orders to implement the TD recommendations (p.103).

18 Oct 39 - U-46 reports 7 torpedo malfunctions in the course of a
convoy battle, following which Dönitz orders all boats to use contact
pistols only. Two days later, TD learns of that order and informs
Dönitz that the torps run 6.5' deeper than set - something which it
had not deemed worth reporting as it made no difference with magnetic
exploders being used, but that would now make a critical difference -
so U-boats are also instructed to set torpedo depth a 2m shallower
than the one they're aiming for. This is a problem when launching
against shallow-draft targets (like DD's) in heavy seas. (p.113)

Late Oct 39 - U-25 reports malfunctions with contact pistols, Dönitz
and OKM are incensed and Raeder orders a new investigation. As TD
swears that the magnetic pistols have been improved, Dönitz tells his
skippers to switch back to these, but deems torpedo quality to be the
#1 problem with his force. (p.115)

November 39 - U-49 reports failures with the new pistols. Raeder is
furious and brings in a civilian (as opposed to Kriegsmarine)
scientist, Dr Cornelius, whom he appoints as torpedo dictator, in
charge of solving the malfunction problem and increasing production.
(p.118)

Before end of year 39 - Raeder fires Wehr as head of TD and replaces
him with Kummetz, presumably with an ominous brief. Days after his
appointment, Kummetz called Dönitz to tell him that, together with
Cornelius, they have conducted tests proving that the German torpedo
is indeed defective. No cure yet, but working on it. (p.136)

The Norway campaign is a long succession of howlers with U-boat
skippers complaining about repeatedly missing golden opportunities,
e.g. Prien's U-47 fires 8 torpedoes at 8 big Allied ships (cruisers
and transports) moored in an overlapping position - a submariner's
dream! - in a Norwegian fjord, achieving no hit (p.154).

After Norway, Dönitz drafts another scathing report, following which
Raeder declares the torpedo problem the #1 Kriegsmarine priority
(until then, surface ships always had had priority over the submarine
force, so for a submarine problem to be kicked up to #1 status is a
lot). With the Baltic no longer being frozen, tests can resume and
show a defect with the needlessly complicated impact pistol. At the
same time (May 5), the RN submarine Seal is captured intact with all
12 torpedoes in working order, the Germans issue immediate orders to
build a reliable contact pistol based on the British design. (p.159)

Shortly thereafter (May 11) the depth-keeping problem is also solved.
As a result, the U-boats conduct an absolute slaughter during the
summer months using contact pistols, and morale soars.

In fact, the depth-setting problem wasn't completely solved: the
casing where the hydrostatic valve was located wasn't completely
airproof so when the submarine had spent too long deep underwater what
the torpedo took as sea level pressure was in fact higher, causing it
to run deep. That particular flaw took an additional two years to
identify and cure, though not because the technical offices of the
Kriegsmarine refused to address the problem but because it had not
been properly identified (testing being conducted from surface ships
or submarines that had not been submerged for long). The US had the
same depth-setting problem with its torpedoes.

Contrast the immediate response by the German Torpedo Directorate, and
quick Kriegsmarine action to replace heads of the technical
departments when things didn't improve quickly enough, with the
administrative war waged by BuOrd in the USN. The Kriegsmarine
immediately acknowledged that the problem was torpedo design and not
the end users, though it took time to find a fix.


LC