soc.history.war.world-war-ii

"Branek" wrote in message
news:kYstj.57748$Pv2.45233@newssvr23.news.prodigy.net...
>I know the IJN lost huge numbers of trained carrier pilots at Coral Sea,
>Midway,

I suppose it comes down to "huge" but the IJN pilot losses at
Coral Sea and Midway were not enough to have major effect.

Having said that it is clear the new pilots sent to the carriers for
Midway were noticeably less proficient than the veterans. Which
is not surprising.

> Santa Cruz/Solomons

This is where the losses ensured the IJNAF would effectively
never be able to match its opponent's average pilot quality in
the air again.

> but
> why were there a lack of replacements? Was there something innately wrong
> w/the IJN pilot training program?

First issue is a training system costs, you need to divert lots of
aircraft and experienced aircrew to the system and not expect to
see any real dividend for a couple of years. Japan went more
for front line strength at the start of the war.

Second issue was the Japanese knew they were outnumbered
so they went for an elite force, which by definition was small.
Pre war they failed men for quite trivial reasons.

Third issue was the Japanese seem to have decided to base their
expected loss rates on those experienced over China. Things like
the IJNAF 12th Air Group claiming 100 kills for the loss of 5 aircraft.

There were voices raised about the lack of pilot training but as
we know not enough was done. Some in the IJNAF were
talking 15,000 pilots a year in 1941.

Note the Japanese Air Forces were expanding, the IJAAF
was forced to realise how much it needed better aircraft from
the fighting in China and against the USSR.

(As an aside the IJAAF was the first of the WWII powers
to specifically ask for a dedicated reconnaissance aircraft
with fighter performance, the Ki-46 Dinah, which first flew
in late November 1939).

The IJNAF was expanding, Soryu arrived at the end of 1937,
bringing the number of carriers to 5, Hiryu in 1939, Zuiho in
1940, Shokaku and Zuikaku in August and September 1941,
Shoho in early 1942, Hiyo and Junyo in mid 1942, Ryuho in
late 1942. To nominate the carriers the IJN had or had under
construction in December 1941, and Shoho onwards were
conversions but some from ships designed to be converted,
in order to work around the treaty limits. The land based air
power was also expanding, since that was not treaty limited.

I am still trying to find again the reference that notes the IJNAF
had more combat aircraft than fully trained pilots in December
1941. As of 1940 it had some 3,371 pilots of whom 2,516
were in operational units (around 900 carrier qualified) and
855 in training, about half the pilots in operational units were
considered insufficiently trained.

Here is my attempt, year, pilot graduations IJNAF, from
Hata and Izawa, see my post in April 2006 under Midway
results vs US Navy Doctrine for more details.

to December 1920 86
1921 19
1922 8
1923 28
1924 58
1925 46
1926 52
1927 60
1928 65
1929 48
1930 44
1931 51
1932 95
1933 216
1934 134
1935 270
1936 217
1937 195
1938 374
1939 507

1940 310 This is the total from 10 classes but full pilot numbers are
missing from pilot classes 50, 51, 52, 53, and the Otsu 8 course. If
these pilot courses were around the same size as 48, 49 and 54 they
would add around 250 to 290 more pilots. Using the same idea for
Otsu 8, that is assuming it was the same size as Otsu 7, would add
around another 60. So 600 to 650 pilots as an estimate.

1941 713 This is the total of 12 classes but full pilot numbers are
missing from pilot classes 55, 56, Otsu 9, Ko 3 and 4. As an
estimate courses 55 and 56 would add around 110 to 130 pilots,
Otsu 9 over 100 pilots, given 200 of the graduates, pilot and
reconnaissance, saw action, Ko 3 and 4 between them graduated
511 pilot and reconnaissance men, so it is probably safe to say
another 250 to 300 pilots. So add 450 to 550 to the 713.

To note the USN figures,

Naval Aviators designated by year, 1935 to 1942:

1935-100, 1936-212, 1937-527, 1938-543, 1939-450, 1940-708
1941-3,112, 1942-10,869

In the period 1935 to 1939 the IJN trained 1,563 pilots if my reading
of Hata and Izawa is correct, the USN 1,832. In 1940 it was around
600 to 650 IJN versus 708 US and in 1941 around 1,200 to 3,112.

In March 1944 the IJNAF had around 14,000 aircrew after some
4,000 men being KIA to date but training standards had been
considerably relaxed to make up numbers.

By the way on an related topic, Shinano was like Midway, open hangar
under an armoured flight deck.

> Ditto for the Japanese army -- considering that they didn't need to train
> their pilots to land on carriers you would
> think they would never have a shortage of pilots.

Pilot training took 12 months or more, depending on what was included
and in peace time recruits often spent a period in the military before
going on to pilot training.

The Japanese air forces were expanding but they did not allow for the
aircrew casualties they would take when fighting the western powers.
The easy victories of the first half of 1942 reinforced the idea the
elite Japanese could fight and win against any opponent.

Training programs started in mid 1942 were going to take until 1944
or later to really bear fruit.

Like the Luftwaffe the Japanese underestimated the requirements for
an air force to tackle their enemies, and found it could not recover
the lost time.

According to the USSBS Japanese aircraft production was 952 in
1935, rising to 1,511 in 1937 then 3,201 in 1938, then 4,467 in 1939,
then things levelled out ,4,778 in 1940 and 5,090 in 1941, before the
big wartime rises. At least part of the levelling out was the introduction
of new models.

I do not have a break down of production by type before 1941 but
the percentage of trainers built 1941 to 1944 is 29%, 24.5%, 17%
and 22%. For the same time period in the US it was 45%, 37%,
23% and 8%.

Avgas supply to Japan was apparently adequate until 1944. A
key problem was units were so far from home and their mechanics
were only equipped to do basic repairs.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.