soc.history.war.world-war-ii

aspqrz@pacific.net.au (Phil McGregor) wrote:
>
> "Scott M. Kozel" wrote:
>
> > Once again, your analogy falls apart. It would be a huge tactical
> > blunder for Sydney crew to have not seen the torpedo tracks long before
> > (at least a minute) they hit.
>
> And this was always the case? There is not one single example in all
> naval history of a crew, even on battle alert, *not* seeing torpedo
> tracks before they hit?

"All naval history" would include the IJN oxygen-fueled torpedoes, so
that is a red herring on your part. The Germans in 1941 did not have
such trackless torpedoes, and it was daytime, so the torpedo tracks
would have been visible to Sydney.

If the range was long enough for Kormoran to feasibly use torpedoes,
that would be a range long enough to activate the firing mechanism and
long enough that Kormoran would not be damaged by the concussion of the
explosions. At least 1,200 yards. That would have been plenty of time
for Sydney to see the torpedo tracks, open fire at Kormoran, open fire
at the torpedoes, and take evasive action.

So, once again, your analogy falls apart.