soc.history.war.world-war-ii

On Mar 27, 3:52 pm, Louis C wrote:
> I'm not saying that there was an operational or tactical rabbit that
> Patton could or should have pulled out of his helmet to capture Metz
> on the run.

Indeed, by that time there was very little running being done on the
Allied side, from mid-September on it was mostly slogging.

> On the other hand, the Metz position was an attack (at the operational
> level) too far, just as Arnhem was for Montgomery.

In that sense you could say that practically all Allied ground
operations during the fall of 1944 were "attacks too far"?
Insufficient means and over-optimistic objectives was something of the
order of the day for the Allies in this period. The sensible thing to
do was to push matters in a maximum effort in Holland and Belgium, but
unfortunately the Allied disposition of forces made that a little
impractical and I'm not clear that a massive reshuffling of forces
would have solved much in the long run? But anyway, I think it would
have been impractical and impolitic, not to mention not militarily
wise, for 12th Army Group to have reverted primarily to a defensive
while letting the Commonwealth solve the problem?

> Where I agree my comparison is flawed is that Market-Garden could have
> captured Arnhem if managed properly while it's difficult to imagine
> Patton capturing Metz on the fly. I'll accept the correction and
> compare Patton's attitude with that of Haig at Paschendaele rather
> than with that of Montgomery at Arnhem if you feel there's a
> significant difference :)

Well, "Metz" *was* pretty much captured on the fly, but the
fortifications surrounding it and controlling the lines of
communication were not, nor should they realistically have been
expected to have been. That was kind of the major problem. :)

But eliminate that and it still becomes a matter similar to that
experienced by the Allies all along the front, their transitory
massive superiority in virtually everything during August-September
had devolved down to a material superiority and even there the
superiority was bedeviled with problems (rationed artillery
ammunition, insufficient replacements and spares for tanks, and poor
weather negating airpower).

> Note that Market-Garden could have been rescued at the tactical level
> (Arnhem captured) but at the operational level (Allies are home free
> east of the Rhine) the Allied wetdream wasn't going to happen IMO.

Quite true. OTOH I don't think the same could be said for Metz, since
it was unlikely the Germans could have been "bounced" out of their
prepared fortifications. But even if it had been the reality was that
Allied logistical limitations would have put paid to any ambitions for
an exploitation beyond the Saar. However, again in that sense, that
was no different than anywhere else for the Allies; blaming the
logistical situation on the army commander is a bit naive (BTW, nor do
I blame Monty for the situation either, the assumption that Antwerp
"should" have been cleared earlier simply ignores the reality of the
situation the Allies were in by mid September).