soc.history.war.world-war-ii

On Feb 18, 6:19 am, "Tero P. Mustalahti" wrote:
> Although I agree that the decision to use 152 mm guns for AT work was
> idiotic, in general we must remember that the Soviet AT situation was
> rather dire at the time of Kursk. The standard AT gun was still the long
> barreled 45 mm M1942, which was practically useless against the front of
> most German tanks, including Pz III J/L/M and Pz IV. So field artillery
> pieces had to be used as part of the antitank front, even if that
> depleted the indirect fire assets. The 76 mm ZiS-3 divisional gun of
> course was relatively well suited for the direct fire role, but it was
> not useless as an indirect fire weapon either, since it had a very high
> rate of fire. In fact it was roughly as useful in the indirect fire role
> as the British 25 pounder, so using them as AT guns diminished indirect
> fire support assets considerably.

Er Tero, I would agree fully with you as well....except. :)

The problem is that the same circumstances existed on the northern
shoulder, but Central Front did not find it neccessary to use their
heavy artillery assets to snipe at tanks with. Instead they made full
use of the heavy antitank gun assets they did have, along with the
lighter pieces.

And the capability to do the same existed in Voronezh Front. In
**addition** to the 76mm divisional (and regimental guns, which were
less suited) guns in the infantry division artillery regiments and
scattered batteries of the tank and mechanized corps, there was a
**large** number of 76mm in the separate AT artillery regiments and
the artillery regiments of the AT brigades deployed by Voronezh Front
opposing the German southern advance. Just at a quick count there were
nine separate regiments and another 18 regiments in the AT brigades
(typically two 76mm regiments with one 45mm regiment). All told they
had a nominal full strength of about 556 pieces and I did a quick
count and came up with at least 369 actually on hand. Now combine
those with the 37-38 infantry division artillery regiments (29 in the
initial deployment) at a nominal 24 pieces each and that is a **lot**
of good 76mm pieces available, with and least 40 percent of them
**dedeicated** antitank weapons. Finally, there were the seven (or
eight) specially-organized and equipped antitank battalions that were
designed **specifically** as a partial solution to the technology gap.
They were equipped with towed 85mm guns (12 per battalion) and were
attached mostly to the tank and mechanized corps at Kursk as stopgaps
until the SU-85 could be deployed later in the year.

But nooooo, the "solution" to the "technology gap" was to deploy
scarce heavy artillery assets as antitank guns? Frankly, it looks more
to me as part and parcel of the muddled thinking that characterized
Soviet deployments and movements in Voronezh Front.

> Summer 1943 was a kind of low point for the Soviets in technological
> sense, since the German Panzer forces were now mostly equipped with new
> models, but the best Soviet tanks had not improved much after 1941.

Yep, but quantity has a quality all its own. To recapitulate, about
369 antitank dedicated 76mm divisional guns, another 500-600 76mm
divisional pieces initially available as dual-purpose artillery/
antitank guns, 84-96 85mm towed antitank pieces (plus potentially the
antiaircraft guns, but they were deployed more into the depth of the
position), all supplemented by the large numbers of 45mm, which did at
least have decent capability against many German vehicles when firing
from the flank. After adding in the SU-76 regiments that were
available, there was close to 1,000 Soviet heavy antitank guns
available to counter the initial German attack. Plus 108 152mm guns?

> Unlike the later SU vehicles, the original SU-122 was almost pure
> infantry support vehicle with very limited AT capability. The Soviets
> also still had large numbers of T-70 light tanks, which were completely
> unsuitable for high intensity battles. It had a two man crew, which put
> the commander/loader/gunner under a huge workload, most of the vehicles
> lacked proper optical gun sights and radios of course were just a dream.

Yep. They also provided just about all the "artillery" capability of
many of the the tank and mechanized corps at this time, since the few
76mm divisional guns were organizationally part of the tank and motor
rifle brigades, in battery strength. Which meant that they were so
decentralized as to be little more than direct fire artillery and
antitank support that was capable of only supporting their parent
brigade. In theory the 120mm mortar regiments were to supply
additional firepower, but their short range usually left them at the
mercy of German artillery once they opened fire. I've wondered for a
while whether or not the "beefing up" of the artillery firepower in
the tank and mechanized corps was partly in reaction to the experience
they had on the southern shoulder at Kursk (at one point the 1st Tank
Army had withdrawn to the north side of the Psel, where the Germans
couldn't attack them directly since they had limited bridging assets,
but the Soviets also could not hinder the movement of the German
columns past their position because of their lack of and the short
range of their artillery.

> So, at the time of Kursk the Germans actually held technological
> superiority when it came to tanks and AT weapons. The Panthers and
> Tigers were just the tip of the iceberg and in fact the Germans would
> have had technological superiority even without them.

To a large extent yes, since the Soviet tank and mechanized corps
organization and equipment was still in flux, not really solidifying
until later in the year.