soc.history.war.world-war-ii

On Feb 13, 9:31 am, Louis C wrote:
> Now that this brilliant firework of rhetoric and evasion of actual
> issues have thoroughly convinced you that my login has been hijacked,
> let's move on to more substantial issues :)

Excellent dodge, I should have taken notes. :)

> Am I allowed the answer of "I have an unimpeachable source which I'll
> certainly post when I find the time to access it again, at some later
> point of this century (or maybe the next)?"
>
> Thought not.

Actually, I don't mind that answer at all, but I'll periodically
remind you of your promise, especially when I find you repeating the
same screed without bothering to mention that you are still searching
for sources to confirm your views. :)

(snip, waffling, side-stepping, and general dodging of the issue :))

> To link back to the "turning point" and "turning received wisdom on
> its head" discussion, the first "revisionist" account of Kursk that I
> read was in the early- to mid-1990's (I think), stating clearly and
> unambiguously that the Soviets had been mauled at Prokhorovka. A while
> later, I read the Glantz & House book on that battle, which said
> roughly the same thing along with an extensive discussion of Soviet &
> German tank losses at Prokhorovka.

Well, as I see it the problem was that in the western literature
through about the late 80's the story of Kursk was one lifted whole-
cloth from the Soviet Progress Press history, which in turn was drawn
from the unclassified Soviet General Staff "report" of the battle,
which in places resembles reality (in the form of what the actual
Soviet and German operational reports were saying) about as closely as
I resemble Hilary Clinton.

Which is sad of course, because western authors had relatively easy
access to the German side of the story, which should at least have
raised some questions. Then Glantz and House, working from Soviet
military journal articles in the 80's while studying Soviet doctrinal
development, started noting odd variances in later accounts from the
official story. So they curiously enough rewrote the story as the
revised Soviet view, which still had some major flaws in it. But on
the other side of the fence we have Nipe and company, who began
rewriting the story entirely from the German view (which of course is
also wrong). The problem then became that they both radically changed
the story, but failed to mesh the versions into a synthesis of events.

So we started with a propaganda piece (Progress Press, Martin Caiden,
et al), then moved to a revised Soviet version (essentially still
ignoring the German side, Glantz and House, et al), a glorification of
the German side (they coulda won, Nipe, et al), and then finally an
analysis of the available, but incomplete numbers and how they fit
into the various versions (Zetterling).

So I'm not sure that the complete version has ever been told, from
what happened to both sides and what and why they did what they did.

> Then I read various discussions in forums (the names of which I have
> now forgotten) in which some very informed people were claiming Glantz
> was junk and that Zetterling fellow was the man. So I get my hands on
> a copy of Zetterling's work about Kursk and find the same data as the
> one analysed by Glantz & House except it's being more taken for
> granted and Prokhorovka is a crushing German success. As I know quite
> a bit about how to make statistics lie, I was instantly wary of that
> reasoning - again: this is purely about Prokhorovka. This is the stuff
> that I remember discussing and that I couldn't find back.

That is not my read of Zetterling at all? And the problem with Glantz
and House is that because of when and who they were originally writing
for (Reagan Cold War, US Army), their version of events had to explain
why the big bad Soviet boogyman suffered so many reverses against the
4. Panzerarmee, even though they had followed all their revered
"operational norms" in planning, and so forth.

And, BTW, Prokhorovka **was** a crushing German defensive success, if
measured as the result of the attack by 5th Guards Tank Army, I'm not
sure how it could be construed as anything els but? IIRC 29th? Tank
Corps began the day of the 12th with 206 operational tanks....and
ended the day with *six*? And 18th Tank Corps was formed into what can
only be described as a modern-day phalanx, with four brigades all
arrayed for an attack driving into a corridor some two kilometers wide
with an impassable river and a nearly impassable rail embankment
constraining their flanks. That they had some initial success
penetrating the German outpost line simply ignores the losses they
took and that the corps was barely operational the next day - and they
were about the most successful of the attackers.

> At some later date, I read Zetterling's whole book which I found very
> good, and have read parts of his Normandy book which I'll pick up
> again when I get my hands on another copy of the work.
> So my beef isn't about Niklas Zetterling in general as an author, it
> is about my remembering his getting in a German-favorable
> interpretation of Prokhorvka and (more dimly) slightly more so of
> Kursk. I do agree with the basics about his book i.e. it's tremendous
> and very good work, the Soviets got mauled tactically in tank combat,
> German tank strength wasn't significantly eroded at Kursk except for
> operational tanks (but then the Soviet position was even worse).

But it is difficult to argue **against** the "German favorable"
version of Prokhorovka if by that you are talking about the general
Soviet counterattack of 12 and 13 July? But if you can, please do
so? :)

BTW, I have had arguments with Niklas over some of his interpretations
in his Normandy book over the years as well, despite having helped
with some of the data in it. :)

> It's quite possible that I remember wrong, I no longer have his book
> (the usual story of "lent it, was never returned") but still have
> Glantz & House and believe I can extract the discussions in which a
> younger and smarter (or maybe just more reckless) version of myself
> compared both.

Part of the problem with Glantz and House I already addressed, another
is that - as I understand it - the German version of events was
actually mostly taken from the postwar USAEUR interviews with the
German participants, rather than from the original operational
documentation, which was utilized only for numerical data (and was
flawed there too as I recall from Niklas' comparison)? Effectively
what there version consists of is a more accurate postwar version of
events.

> It depends on where you draw the line. To me, rag tag includes
> drafting in older classes and younger, inadequately-trained reservists
> in combat duties.

I don't think that in fact is so, but 1943 **was** the watershed year
for that. The records of the Organisation-Abteilung of the Heer become
quite concerned with manpower issues - in terms of manpower classes
and quality - in the spring of 1943, with the problem becoming truly
critical in the fall. But yes, overall manpower of any kind was a
constant German problem, from mobilization onwards (btw, there were
few reservists left after mobilization in August 1939, except for
those few discharged in fall 1940 who were called up again later on.

Fundamentally Wehrmacht manpower peaked in early 1943 and then began
to shrink, at that point is when manpower utilization became critical,
leading to organizational changes and the influx of the "rag tag",
mostly into service-support positions (HiWi were officially sanctioned
27 January 1943). But it wasn't really until the Goebbels-Aktion of
March 1945 that eliminated most deferrels.

Anyway, this is a highly complex subject, a start to covering it would
be "German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II", HERO
Report No. 48, which is available for purchase as a PDF on CD at our
website. :) Otherwise, the best work that I know of on the subject is
still in thesis format and is incomplete still as of the last time I
checked.

> You're right that given what the Germans would later do, I should
> reserve the term "rag tag" for the non-German formations and
> Volkssturm units, but what I meant was that there was only a finite
> pool of competent German infantry and the Germans were running out of
> that.

Er, so were the Soviets?

> The German figures for mid-1943 were helped by moving more rear-area
> personnel to the front but that also meant a decline in quality in the
> fighting formations, as well as being a one-time remedy. Losses of
> good German infantrymen were essentially not replaceable. (snip)

But it was a two-way street, in August 1944 German infantry were being
retrained as signalmen and Panzer officers were being drawn on for
courses to become supply officers. :)

> Ok, so I'll delete my original statement from this reply and claim I
> never wrote such a thing you just read me wrong. Do I fit the part
> better now? :)

We should stop being so catty. :) Sometimes this board reminds me too
much of junior high school. )

> Seriously: see above for the pro-German thing. I don't know Niklas
> Zetterling personally, I know for a fact that he is held in high
> esteem by people who are definitely in the "Germans were Gods" crowd
> though it's indeed not evidence.

The "Black Uniforms With Silver Lace Are Way Cool" crowd are
problematic. Note that Niklas is not admiring the Germans, he is
trying to understand how they were capable of doing so well with so
many problems.

> This time I do think you're reading too much into my post, or maybe
> conflating it with David's. (snip)

Yes, I knew that trying to reply to you both near simultaneously had
its pitfalls, sorry.

> I'm fairly sure that this is in Zetterling's book, or if it isn't I'll
> dig out the Glantz & House Kursk book from behind the ton of stuff
> where it currently resides and post a quote. I read quite a few things
> about Kursk but all of it was some years ago.

So did I. Which makes coming back up to speed difficult, for one thing
I've forgotten the Cyrillic alphabet (not that I ver knew it that
well) so have a terrible time reading the Soviet maps and documents
now.

> Yes, on the other hand losing the ability to generate operational
> tanks is a blow when the enemy is determined to keep attacking for the
> next few months. I don't remember Panzer Lehr being all that well-off
> at the end of the summer :)

Yep, in the longterm it certainly is.