Robert Warinner
> David Thornley
> Both Frank and Hasegawa argue it is the collapse of the Ketsu-go assumptions
> that led Japan to surrender. Where they part company is that Hasegawa would
> say it was the USSR's declaration of war and invasion that dashed the hopes of
> a peace on Japan's terms,
This still doesn't address Anami's actions; he stated from the start (as
did others, including Sato) that the Russians would not help the
Japanese.
> fundamental to understanding Japan's surrender. Without Ketsu-go it is
> impossible to explain Japanese actions without resorting to clinical
> psychology.
Which may be the best way to go about it.
> Hasegawa's points to the lack of contemporary evidence that the atomic
> bombings motivated Japan's surrender.
> neither. Other participants claim the Emperor cited both the atomic bombs and
> Russi's declaration of war as justification of surrender.
In the sixties, Kido was interviewed by Japanese scholars for a few
books on the surrender (as well as the events leading up to the
bombings.) From the published interviews, it is plain the Japanese were
much more concerned with US actions, and the bombings, than the Soviet
actions.
Mike