soc.history.war.world-war-ii

David Thornley wrote:
: The problem is that, when I started reading Hasegawa, I started getting
: put off by the anti-US attitude, and the twisted logic.

Yes, I sometimes have to stop my knee from jerking when reading Hasegawa. In
particular, I don't buy his assessment of Truman's and Byrne's motives. But he
also has harsh words for the Emperor and Japanese leaders as well.

: I'd like to see the evidence in a setting that strikes me as more
: or less impartial. I have trouble reading Hasegawa. It seems to
: me that the evidence points to the nuclear weapons as making the
: difference, and I'd be interested in conflicting evidence.

He lays out his basic arguments in the final chapter without most of the axe
grinding that comes before. I'll try to recap as best as I can.

Hasegawa argues that Japan's surrender cannot be understood outside of the
Ketsu-go plan. Ketsu-go acknowledged that Japan had been defeated and aimed at
obtaining the best possible terms from the Allies, preferably at a
post-armistice peace conference, and only after an American invasion of Kyushu
had been repulsed or bloodied.

Ketsu-go was based on two fundamental assumptions: that the US would invade
Kyushu and that Japan would be able to use the Soviet Union to arrange the
terms of surrender with the US and Britain. So far, so good: this is the
starting point of both Hasegawa and Richard Frank.

Both Frank and Hasegawa argue it is the collapse of the Ketsu-go assumptions
that led Japan to surrender. Where they part company is that Hasegawa would
say it was the USSR's declaration of war and invasion that dashed the hopes of
a peace on Japan's terms, while Frank argues that the atomic bombings showed
that the US did not have to invade Kyushu to destroy Japan's ability to carry
on the war.

I think both Hasegawa and Frank are right in saying that Ketsu-go is
fundamental to understanding Japan's surrender. Without Ketsu-go it is
impossible to explain Japanese actions without resorting to clinical
psychology.

In Hasegawa's favor, the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan was a
tangible refutation of Ketsu-go. Japan had absolutely no insight into US
strategic calculations. The atomic bombings did not necessarily mean
that the US had abandoned its plans to invade Kyushu. The Japanese
leadership did not see the bombs as a qualitative escalation of the strategic
bombing campaign. In addition, Japanese leaders were very eager to avoid an
occupation of Japan, especially by the Soviets. By surrendering before the
USSR was an immediate military threat, Japanese leaders hoped to avoid the
fate of Germany.

Hasegawa's points to the lack of contemporary evidence that the atomic
bombings motivated Japan's surrender. Some of the Imperial rescripts ordering
surrender mention the bombs, some mention the attack of the Soviets and some
neither. Other participants claim the Emperor cited both the atomic bombs and
Russi's declaration of war as justification of surrender. So the evidence is a
mixed bag.

There are downsides to Hasegawa's argument. One is just plain plausibility; it
is hard to believe the Japanese would ignore the very real US wolf at its door
for the Russian bear in its back yard. Another is that the diplomatic option
was the favorite of the civilians and perhaps the Emperor, though the evidence
is ambiguous. The entry of the USSR undercut the 'peace' faction, not the
military who still held the upper hand in the government. I suppose the USSR's
military successes in Manchuria would have also affected the military,
particularly the Army, but it is not clear that the Army knew how badly it was
being defeated.

The bottom line is that extremely compressed time of atomic bombings and
Soviet declaration of war and invasion make it extremely difficult to sort out
which had the greatest impact. Certainly the Japanese leaders themselves did
not have the time to ponder them and weigh up which was the most important.


Andrew Warinner
warinner@xnet.com
http://home.xnet.com/~warinner