soc.history.war.world-war-ii

Robert Warinner wrote:
> David Thornley wrote:
> : In article ,
> : edward ohare wrote:
> : And
> :>the firebombings didn't make Japan quit.

> : No.

> : The nukes did.

> There are other possible explanations.

> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's "Racing the Enemy" postulates that it was the Soviet
> declaration of war on Japan and subsequent invasion of Manchuria that did the
> trick.

Does he address that after this invasion, Anami postponed a council
meeting, declaring he had "more important business elsewhere"?

> I would not defend Hasegawa's thesis to the death but he does marshall a
> certain amount of evidence to support it.

Which is interesting, in that the leader of the "No surrender" faction,
General Anami, not only expected the Soviets to declare war on Japan at
some point, but looked forward to it, believing that the US would feel
it necessary to make serious concessions to the Japanese in order to
prevent the Russians from gaining too much, militarily, in Japan's old
possessions.

> The Imperial War Council was a small group of leaders with various interests
> and perspectives, bound by elaborate protocol and precedent. It should not be
> a surprise that the strategic calculations they made did not correspond to how
> US leaders saw them.

Not sure what precedent they were bound by. However, their strategic
calculations were not much different from those of the US; they were
simply quite stubborn, and honestly believed that the death of almost
all Japanese was a viable option.

> In that situation, and given the lack of contemporary records of the decision,
> Hasegawa does make a defensible case.

Actually, very good records were kept of the decision process, and have
been available for some time, even in Japanese.

I occassionally hear these sorts of things from modern scholars,
sometimes even Japanese ones. I have yet to see them address the actual
notes of the discussions of the Liaison Council.

Mike