"Rich"
news:862ad71f-fdd0-4c3e-bab2-072184c05a3b@n77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
> On Feb 26, 1:03 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair"
> wrote:
>> The reality is the Luftwaffe lacked the control facilities to concentrate
>> fighters against raids. See for example the problems the RAF had in
>> 1940 even with the most advanced system in the world.
>
> Quite simply, it also lacked the ability to generate a daily sortie
> rate that came even close to matching its numercial strength. If we
> look at the "peak" of the battle of Britain for example, we find that
> a force of some 2,000 nominally operational aircraft managed to
> generate a maximum of around 1,000 sorties per day, and that only on
> selected days.
Has there been any work done on the causes of the sortie rate?
How much as aircrew supply? Including the need to rest the crews.
How much was aircraft supply?
How much was spare parts and consumables supply?
How much were due to the problems of the temporary airfields in
France, that is local rather than global supply issues?
How much was due to the realisation the RAF defences meant the
number of bombers used had to be limited to ensure they had
adequate escorts?
Just a few simply questions. :-)
As far as I know each had a part to play, the lack of fighters was a
major factor as the battle continued, there was a lack of spare parts
production as well as new aircraft, the aircrew training system could
not keep up with losses, Goering's single officer per bomber is a clue
this affected bombers as well as the known problems with new fighter
pilots, and air operations take bulk supplies and some to many of the
French airfields being used lacked good bulk transport facilities.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.