humanities.philosophy.objectivism

David Schwartz wrote:
> On Mar 28, 4:15 pm, Reggie Perrin wrote:
>
>> No, that's not what he said. He said that if "exists" (I think the
>> "really" is redundant) means "exists without consciousness" then it
>> cannot be said that consciousness exists. The problem is easily resolved
>> though: existence can be either mind-independent or not; the Sun falls
>> into the former category and consciousness into the latter.
>
> Which category do indivisible atoms fall into? Which category do
> particles with precise positions at precise times fall into?

As Gordon has noted, you are conflating two issues: the existence of the
referent and the ascription of properties to it. Atoms exist
independently of our minds. They existed when people thought they were
indivisible. They existed when there were no people to think about them
at all. That's just what it means to have a mind-independent existence.

Now, what happened in the case of atoms is that people mistakenly
ascribed the property "indivisible" to them. But it would not be
difficult to establish that e.g. Dalton and Rutherford were referring to
the same objects, objects which (of course) have a mind-independent
existence. To choose a more homely example: let's say I have a picture
on my wall that I believe to be a Constable, but is actually a fake. Are
we to say that "Reggie's Constable" does not exist, or are we to say
that the painting exists and that I am mistaken about its origins? I
suggest that the latter is to be preferred.