humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Sun, 30 Mar 2008 14:00:43 -0700, Ken Gardner
wrote:

>Malrassic Park wrote:
.
>>I see you finally took a day off. That whole "virtue of productivity"
>>thing needs to go right out the window with all the rest of those
>>so-called "virtues" which are merely devices to replace religion's
>>monopoly on morality.
.
>This is one of the first sensible things I remember you saying here in
>years. :)
.
>>"Conciousness is a process of differentiating and integrating, i.e.
>>classifying existents." Classification is not synonymous with
>>differentation and integration. Your confusion is no doubt due to
>>Rand's failure to properly identify, that is, define what the process
>>of classification consists of. She described classification somewhat,
>>but never defined it.
.
>I understood her to be saying that classification is differentiating
>and integrating on the conceptual level. She repeatedly refers to
>conceptualization as a method of classifying existents. See
>especially the end of Chapter 5 and most of Chapter 7.

Existents can be classified by genus/species, that is, by their
defining characteristics. But concept-formation is not the only way
of regarding things. Things can be classified in terms of any
characteristics held in common, they don't have to be defining
characteristics. A member of the class of all red books is still a
unit, their similarity involves their redness and bookness, focusing
on a single member of this class defines it as a unit.

Rand's theory assumes that we begin without the ability to make such
perceptual distinctions. We learn to distinguish separate objects in
our perceptual field, then integrate them into classes of entities,
and finally, to form verbal and non-verbal concepts of entities. A
concept of an entity assumes that it exists within a taxonomical
system of relationships and inter-relationships. These are not merely
random classes and sub-classes, the relationships are hierarchical and
systematically structured.

Knowledge arises from this system of concepts in the form of general
theories.

>>Rand left her readers with a mish-mash of approximate meanings
>>for "classification," "property," and "attribute." It is obvious from
>>the responses I'm getting here that "property" is being treated
>>synonymously with "attribute." An introductory work should have
>>at least separated and defined these basic terms.
.
>>As a result, people like you are left floundering in a sea of terms
>>which you believe have been properly formed simply because they
>>emanated from the mind of Rand.
.
>Not just Rand. Have you ever read Aristotle's Categories?

Enough to know that they would have better been called "postulates"
than "categories," and that Rand and Peikoff have committed the same
error by calling them "axioms."

>>An object has the characteristic of reflecting light-waves into your
>>eyes which you then perceive, through your faculty of perception,
>>as color. So you see, your mind also plays a role in producing
>>perceptions.
.
>Exactly. The mind plays a role, and reality plays a role. This is
>precisely what Rand means by "objective," as opposed to intrinsic
>(where the mind's role in processing concepts is denied) and
>subjective (where reality's role in dictating the content of concepts
>is denied). See ITOE pages 52-54, as well as the first section in
>Chapter 4 of OPAR. The best summation of this point is on page 54 of
>ITOE. This theory of concepts is how the entire philosophy got its
>name. That's how fundamental and important it is. See also the
>concluding pages of Chapter 8, where she again emphasizes that any
>proper method of cognition must take into account both the nature of
>existence and the nature of human consciousness.

I'm not arguing against Rand, I am arguing against your proclamation
that the color red exists outside the mind: "that quality would exist
in the object regardless of whether we humans would be around to
perceive it as red."

>In my opinion, about 99.99 percent of people who don't understand
>Objectivism don't understand these points. As Aristotle used to say,
>from little mistakes in the beginning come huge mistakes at the end
>(or something like that). Only this isn't little. This relationship
>of consciousness to existence (including its normative aspects, i.e.
>striving to form and hold your concepts and conclusions objectively
>rather than intrinsically or subjectivlye) is the essence, the core,
>the fundamental normative principle of the entire philosophy. If you
>don't get it, you aren't an Objectivist and you don't understand
>Objectivism. Period. End of story. No matter how much you think you
>know or understand from her other writings.

You should have remembered that before you declared that qualities
such as the color red exist whether or not anybody is around to
perceive it.

>>See ITOE pages 5 and 279. Page 5 explains how
>>percepts are formed by the brain, page 279 explains that 'we perceive
>>light vibrations as color,' and more, ' Everything we perceive is the
>>result of our processing.' Processing, of what? Light vibrations, not
>>color. Color is only the result of the processing.
.
>But these light vibrations that result in us perceiving red exist in
>reality, not in our minds. It isn't something we make up. Again, in
>forming the concept red (or redness), reality plays a role and our
>minds play a role.

You should have remembered that before you declared that qualities
such as the color red exist whether or not anybody is around to
perceive it.

>>>>Here's the point that Rand amazingly overlooked: we do not simply
>>>>classify things by means of their shape or color.
.
>>>Rand doesn't deny this. She covers this point in Chapter 3.
.
>>I need more to go on than that. That's why I cite page numbers, not
>>whole chapters.
.
>In this case, the relevant quote is in Chapter 1. I'm too lazy to
>look inside that book today, but it is the paragraph where she says we
>can classify objects by size, shape, color, atomic structure, etc.
>Never does she suggest or imply that our modes of classification are
>limited to shape or color.

You're quoting me out of context. The paragraph just before I had
written about "the point that Rand amazingly overlooked," I had
written: 'First of all, notice that Rand agrees with me on what she
calls the criterion of classification: "one may classify things
according to their shape or color or weight or size or atomic
structure."' Therefore I was making a different point entirely, which
you then judiciously snipped. Therefore, I'll simply repeat it:

-===-We must first abstract these attributes, these critieria, into
properties, in order to grant them meaning for the class of existents.
A property, as a class concept, is an attribute that holds true for
every entity in the class. An example of such a property, like the
criterion of color she mentioned in the quote, would be "redness."

Conceptualization is a method of classification. A concept is a class
of units (or alternately, members of a class of existents) defined
according to those properties regarded essential to forming the
concept.

That is Rand's answer to the problem of universals which, or so I'm
told, she didn't take seriously enough to solve. Universals aren't to
be ignored, they are essential to forming classes, and thereafter if
need be, concepts.-===-

That is the point Rand amazingly overlooked.

>>>And we do this by means of measurement-omission.
.
>>Which, however, doesn't work for defining either "red" or "redness."
>>Observing the lengths of objects is certainly a matter of perception,
>>whereas wavelength on the color spectrum is obviously a scientific,
>>conceptual discovery, not perceived.
.
>Wavelength is certainly a scientific discovery, but its effects is
>observable by just about anyone. My three year old niece doesn't know
>a thing about wavelengths, but she can certainly distinguish red from
>green or blue.

Beside the point. You snipped my theory and then started talking about
obvious things like this.

>>>Note again that in this process our minds play a part, but reality
>>>also plays a part. We can do this only becuase the units being
>>>conceptualized ARE the same in a certain respect (their distinguishing
>>>characteristics). But the process itself is something we do
>>>ourselves. It is a volitional, methodical way of organizing
>>>perceptual material into concepts, propositions, etc.
.
>>Regurgitating the theory back to me does nothing to fix Rand's errors.
.
>My point here was that you were attacking a straw man. You seem to be
>attributing to her the same errors that she attributed to the
>intrincisists.

And you seem to be snipping my theory, quoting me out of context, and
then focusing on obviousness. I'm not accusing you of doing this on
purpose, a whole week goes by between responses so its easy to lose
the thread of discussion.

>>With 'regarding' as "a selective focus" (as she said), yours is not a
>>selective focusing at all. Rand did not say anything about "regarding"
>>the fact that there "may be" more than one existent. Rand started with
>>a group of two or more similar members.
.
>No, not a group of two or more similar members,

"A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two
or more similar members." (6)

>but a selective mental
>focus or perspective that regards an existent as being a member of
>such a group. The difference is huge. In reality, there may be only
>one such existent that you may have ever perceved. But to form a
>concept of such a concept, you first need to think of that existent as
>a member of a group of two or more similar members. Then, if you see
>another such unit in the future, you can subsume it under your
>previously formed concept. Or if you are dealing with the first unit,
>you can use your previously formed concept when thinking about it
>instead of beginning the entire process of concept formation again
>from scratch.

Remember, Rand starts from the perspective of a small child: an
undifferentiated chaos. Learning to differentiate "existent" into
entities, and finally into units, is a long, slow process.

>>Units are similar. You do not need to regard the existent as a
>>separate member of a group of two or more similar members (1) if you
>>need to distinguish this pink elephant from other animals.
.
>But you do, if you want to make this distinction on the conceptual
>level. You must have the concept before you can distinguish it from
>other concepts. The unit perspective and measurement omission is
>built into the process of forming any concept. It is what ENABLES us
>to form concepts in the first place.

I'm not primarily distinguishing a concept from other concepts, I must
take the perceived matter first and then form the concept from that
based on its relationship to other concepts.

>>It stands
>>apart from the rest without requiring two or more members to regard.
>>You first need to classify it as a member of the class "elephant." In
>>this way, you already have two or more similar members, disregarding
>>for the moment the pink versus grey color differentiation.
.
>But what you are describing is exactly what Rand described. Think of
>it this way. What you are calling the class of pink elephants is what
>you would regard as the group of similar members when regarding a pink
>elephant as a member of that group. The unit perspective is how we
>humans are able to classify existents in the first place.

I am saying that the class of pink elephants is distinct enough to be
considered a sub-class of the class of elephants, but not distinct
enough to be granted a concept in its own right. The existence of a
pink elephant, or even of a thousand of them, has no taxonomical
importance.

>>So let me try again with my original point. "A unit is an existent
>>regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar
>>members." (6) Rand starts with a group of two or more similar members
>>-- but this is just the idea of a concept analyzed down to what makes
>>a class of entities capable of being regarded as a unit: their
>>similarities. This is just circular argumentation which avoids looking
>>into the mind's very ability to form relationships of similarity.
>
>You were doing great until the last sentence. We can regard members
>as units (or as class members of a class of similar existents) BECAUSE
>our minds are capable of regarding existents as units (or, if you
>prefer, as members of a class of similar members) -- a method of
>cognitive classification that other animal species are unable to
>follow. She makes this point very explicitly in Chapter 1.

That is a capacity based in no explanation at all. At this juncture,
Rand would want to examine some brains to see how they work. But
how the brain works is not the question, mental functioning is of
epistemological relevance here. How does the mind function to regard
entities as units? How does the mind perceive similarities? How does
the mind focus its attention? 'It is the task of epistemology to
provide the answer to the "How?"' (79) Okay, Miss Rand, so tell us
how the mind perceives similarities, and how the mind focuses its
attention. No answer? Was that a blank-out, Miss Rand?

>>>Whoa, nellie! She didn't say "units do not exist." She said that
>>>units do not exist QUA UNITS. The difference is huge. If humans
>>>ceased to exist, the remaining existents would still exist. The human
>>>perspective that regards them as units (as opposed to merely
>>>individual concretes) would be gone.
.
>>Is "unit" a concept of consciousness or a concept of method? Is
>>"similarity" a concept of consciousness or a concept of method? And
>>where did these concepts come from?
.
>The answer to both questions is "neither," except in the sense that
>concepts of conciousness (including concepts of method) integrate the
>mental states that are subsumed by these concepts. The trees in my
>front yards are units as well as existents. When we humans then
>regard them as units as well as particular concretes or existents, we
>can form the concept "tree" and use it to grasp that those things in
>my front yard are trees. Likewise, the sun has a similar shape to the
>earth regardless of whether any human beings are around to perceive
>that similarity. Etc.

You're equivocating between the concepts "unit" and "tree." You
answered the question in the first sentence simply by altering the
question into the form of a statement. You never got around to
answering "and where did these concepts come from?" But if you
answered, from consciousness, then you'd be on the right track.

>>I have said that whenever an Objectivist equates the term
>>"metaphysical" to the world outside his mind, that is by means of
>>an Aristotelian implication.
.
>Right. Objectivism metaphysics is essentially Aristotelian except for
>the prime mover nonsense.

That is teleological 'nonsense', not exactly metaphysics. When
Aristotle claims that universals subsist in things, that is a
metaphysical statement. Any statement about universals is metaphysics,
or better, metaphysics is the study of universals. When Rand or any of
you refer to the metaphysical, you are locating (reifying) universals
in the external world. You are being intrinsicists of the moderate
realist variety.

>>At the very least, it takes for granted a
>>relationship without defining exactly what it is, and at worst it is a
>>reification.The world outside your mind is not metaphysical, it is
>>physical. If there is any metaphysical, it is a part of your own mind.
>>The issue of universals is how to bridge the gap between the
>>metaphysical (mind) and the physical (matter).
.
>The issue is as Rand stated it in the forward. We gain and hold
>knowledge mostly in conceptual form.

Rand quoting Edward C. Moore in the Foreword, "All knowledge is in
terms of concepts." That does not say "mostly."

>But how is it that concepts can
>represent valid human knowledge of the world outside our mind? The
>purpose of epistemology is to answer this question. You have to know
>how to show (prove, validate) that your conceptual conclusions
>correspond to the way things actually are. Otherwise, all you have
>is mere guesswork.

You are confusing epistemology with logic. Correspondence theory is a
logic theory.

>>I will hazard a guess and say that I've read it many more times than
>>you have. Muttering a few things about "measurement-omission" just
>>doesn't cut it with me when I know what it means and I also know that
>>it cannot be a primary. What measurements did you omit when forming
>>the concept "fame"?
.
>The many different instances of famous people, the events or
>circumstances that made them famous, and the different types of fame
>-- at least for starters.

Omitting the measurements of different instances of famous people, the
measurements of events or circumstances that made them famous, will
do nothing to aid your concept-forming. All you're doing is searching
for the measurables in reality, for famous people and famous events,
implying that those are measurable *distinguishing characteristics,*
and then omitting them. But people are not characteristics, fame is
the characteristic here.

For starters you should determine if "fame" is a concept of
consciousness. But then it's all downhill from there, because you
cannot measure "fame" anyway, and anything that can be defined
must first be measurable before those measurements are omitted.

Even if measurement-omission is valid for defining some concepts, it
is not necessarily valid for defining all of them.

>>>>As for the rest of that paragraph, I don't think you'll ever except
>>>>the idea that the color 'red' doesn't exist externally to the mind, it
>>>>is a product of perception acting upon light-waves.
.
>>>You are correct: I would not accept this idea because it is simply
>>>wrong. The object has a certain attribute or quality that we humans
>>>call "redness." We call it that because when we perceive it, we
>>>perceive it as being red, i.e. as being within the red range of color.
>>>But that quality would exist in the object regardless of whether we
>>>humans would be around to perceive it as red (or if everyone somehow
>>>became color-blind).
.
>>AR: "We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore you would say
>>the color is not in the object. The object absorbs certain parts of
>>the spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of
>>reality by means of the structure of the eye." (279)
.
>She is saying that the concept color is not intrinsic nor subjective,
>but objective. Its color is not in the object apart from us, or in us
>apart from the object. In this example, light is absorbed by and
>reflected off the object (the role played by reality, including our
>physical organs and nervous system as well as the object itself) in
>such a way that we perceive it as a certain color (the role played by
>our minds), which we later learn to integrate into the higher level
>concept "color" (as opposed to specific colors such as blue, red,
>green, etc.).
>
>>*The color red is not in the object.* Rand got something right for a
>>change, but only because she chose to believe "evil modern science"
>>instead of going with her own theory. So you are forced to disagree
>>with Rand. The 'fact of reality' is the absorption and reflection of
>>certain parts of the spectrum of light, it is not color.
.
>The disagreement here is not with Rand,

No, it is between Aristotle and Rand with you playing the role of
Aristotle in the following statement: "that quality would exist in the
object regardless of whether we humans would be around to perceive it
as red."

> but with Aristotle, who
>(according to some translations, not necessarily mine) held that the
>concept "color" was solely within the object.

Not the concept, the universal, which would be redness in this case.
But that is only because Aristotle lacked the scientific knowledge to
know better, and mistakenly attributed color to the object, leaving
the mind's activity out of its perception.

Furthermore, you are confusing the origins of a concept with the
concept itself. You say that color is neither intrinsic nor subjective
because both mind and matter play a role in its creation: without
matter there would be no light-waves, without mind there would be
no interpretive mechanism. However, it is far more likely that
light-waves exist only in the realm of matter, while color exists only
in the realm of mind. Because its origin does not matter, what matters
is that color, which is the result of this or that process, is only in
the mind, and is not found in matter. (See ITOE, page 5.)

>>But she was wrong to say we perceive the absorption and reflection
>>of light, the latter is a scientific, conceptual discovery not a
>>perceived fact.
.
>She means that we perceive the effect immediately (my three year old
>niece gets "red" or "blue"), but come to understand it much later as a
>scientific, conceptual discovery.

I'm sure she did mean to say that, but notice that nobody questioned
her statement, or if they did, Binswanger edited it out.

>>Unfortunately for your theory, not even Rand believed that the color
>>red will continue existing even if nobody was around to regard it as
>>the color red.
.
>The characteristics of the object that caused us to see it as red
>would continue to exist. There would be no humans around to perceive
>it as red. And of course, the concept of redness would no longer
>exist either.

However you may want to say it, the color red does not exist in the
absence of eyes and minds to form sensations of redness out of
light-waves.

>>>Relationships between or among existents are grasped, not formed or
>>>invented in the mind. For example, the sun would be larger and have a
>>>greater mass than the earth even if ther was no one around to grasp
>>>these relationships between the two.
.
>>Relationships are not "grasped," they are established. 'The process
>>of measurement is a process of integrating an unlimited scale of
>>knowledge to man's limited perceptual experience - a process of
>>making the universe knowable by bringing it within the range of man's
>>consciousness, by establishing its relationship to man".' (8)
.
>She is using "establishing" here in the same sense as "grasping." But
>we don't "establish," in the different sense you seem to be implying
>(or in any sense that is different from "grasping"), that the sun is
>larger and has a greater mass than the earth. These facts simply
>exist, whether we grasp them or not.

Certainly we grasp *certain* relationships, and I don't want to use
"establish" in any sense distinct from Rand's. The question remains,
what did she mean by it and why did she use it consistently in the
context of relationships to man? To establish is a foundational term,
it goes in line with her statements about relating measurements to
units easily perceivable by man.
--
How was chirch this morning? - Michael Gordge